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Introduction
on January 1,1946, the Emperor of Japan denied that he was a living
god. The Constitution of Japan, which was enforced on May 3, 1947,
proclaimed th4t "sovereip power resides with the people.,' while the
Emperor descended from heaven to earth, the Japanese people were
liberated from servitude. "Democracy" began in spite of-or strangely
enough, precisely because of-the fact that Japan was still occupied by
the Allied Forces.(r)
Apart from the fact that "democracy" was given from outside, there
were (or have been) many big obstacles to the democratization of Japanese
society which was characterized by such words as .,Asiatic," ..authori-
tarian," "feudalistic," or "ultranationalistic." Among other things, the
drastic reforms in political, economic, and social spheres had to be done
by the same Japanese who had been shaped by the old regime.rz)
@l945,,wasbroughtaboutforcibly..fromoutside''and
that the subaequent reforms were carried out under the direction of G.H.e. has becn
keenly recognized by many Japanese intellectuals as a decisively importait incident
for the democratization of Japanesc society. See e.g., Kindabhugi, Rokur6 Hidaka ed.,(fokyo: chikuma shob6, 1964), p. 29. Margaret A. Mckean says that ..onry thirty
years ago the American Occupation surgically implanted democratic institutions into
the Japanese body politic." Margaret A. Mckean, ..political Socialization Through
citizens' Movements," in Political opposition and l-ocal polirics in Japan, K. steiner et
al. eds., (Princeton, New Jersey: princeton University press, I9g0), p-230.
<2' In a sense, this kind of predicament is by no means peculiar to the process of the
revolutionary changes of Japanese society. Alcxis de Tocqueville, .for example, argues
that the French people under the rule of Louis Napoleon were essentially the same as
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In this context, it is very natural that many inteflectuals felt that in_
stitutional and organizational revolutions were not sufficient. In other
words, they thought the emergence and development of the democratic
citizen-the spiritual revolution-was the slze qua non before democracy
could be rooted deeply into the soil of Japanese society. Tremendous
energy on the part of intellectuals and of citizens as well has since been
spent especially on the actualization of citizen participation in poritics.
In this bibliographical essay, I want to pick up several books and articres
which dear with the theory and practice of citizen participation in postwar
Japanese poritics. After examining their theories on an individuar basis,I want to clarify what they have in common, how they differ from each
other, and what light they will throw upon the development and further-
ance of democracy in Japan and upon the study of this field.
some preliminary remarks are necessary as to the selection of the
literature on citizen participation in postwar Japanese politics. phrases
such as citizens' participation (shimin sanka), citizens, movement (shimin
undd), or residents' participation (iilmin sanka), came into vogue in the
late 60's in Japan, both in the social sciences and in an everyday life.
There is, however, a tradition of democratic movements (protests) in
modern Japanese history such as the Meiji restoration (Meiji ishin), the
Freedom and peopre's rights movem ent (iiyil minken undd), orthe Taisho
democracy, to mention a few exampres.(B) In this sense, it may be fairry
said, precedents for "citizen participation" can be sought even in prewar
Japanese history' In this paper, however, I want to start by examining
democratic theories of "postwar enrightenment,, for the following reasons.
First, there is a decisive difference between the prewar and the postwar
democratic movements in that "democracy" is publicly (i.e., constitu-
the French peopre before the Revolution of 17g9. ..They were men who had beenshaped by the old order, and I shail show how they remained the same essentiafly andin fact, despite superficiar alterations due to the march of events, never changed out ofrecognition'" Alexis de Tocqueville, The old Regime ond rhe French Revolution(Garden City, New york: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), p. x.(a) Japan is usualry characterized u, u 
"onranruul 
society. Against this characteri_
zation, the essays compired in conflict in Modern Japanese Hisrory,T. Najita and J. v.Koschmann, eds., (princeton, New Jersey: princetonUniversity press, f Sgil, 
";;1,*lr"the dimension of conflict as a central experience in modern Japanese history.
(4s7 )
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tionally) recognized as a legitimate form of government after the Second
World War while "democracy" did not enjoy such a constitutional
recognition in prewar Japanese politics. Second, in order to understand
clearly the significance of the appearance and development of citizen
participation in the late 60's, it seems very important to confirm some
basic characteristics of "postwar enlightenment," because the theory
and practice of citizen participation itself can be seen in a sense as an
evolution of "postwar enlightenment," and in another as a departure
from it.
Postwar Enlightenment and the Formation of
Modern Man
Our purpose in this section is not to define what "postwar enlighten-
ment" is,(r) 6ut rather to elicit some salient features of it which are to have
some relevance to the emergence of the movements of citizen participation.
The most fruitful way to accomplish this task, I believe, is to analyze two
representatives of "postwar enlightenment" ideology: Hisao Otsuka and
Masao Maruyama. Although they differ in specialization (Otsuka is an
eminent scholar of British economic history; Maruyama is a very famous
political scientist), they share some important similarities not only in
their academic method, but also in their political attitude toward the
direction of democratization of postwar Japanese society. To be more
specific, they each are heavily influenced by both Marx and Weber, but
they seek to understand Weber "not as an alternative, but as a complement,
to Marx." Thus "the Weberian theory provides one of the most im-
portant components of their analytical framework."(2) More significant-
ly, especially for our present purpose, the fact that they incorporate the
Weberian method into their analytical framework entails also practical
(i.e., political) implications for them, because they do not accept the vulgar
(r) Cf. e.g., Mitsunobu Sugiyama, Sengo keim6 to shakaikagaku no shisd (Tokyo:
Shinyosha, 1983).(2) Takeshi Ishida, "A Current Japanese Interpretation of Max Weber,', in Japanese
Political Czlrare (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, Inc., 1983), p. 56. See
also Yoshiaki Uchida, "Bunkajuyd to shiteno Weber-juy6," in Rekishi to sha&ad (Tokyo:
Riburop6to, 1983, May), Vol. 2. pp. 4r',3-517, esp., pp. M7-4N.
(456)
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materialistic view of history as determined merely by the economic struc-
ture of society, but rather they emphasize relative independence ofhuman
thought or consciousness from external conditions, as will be shown
presently.
Let us begin with Hisao Otsuka. During the couple of years im-
mediately following the end of the war, Otsuka enthusiastically advocates
..the formation of modern man" and "the human basis of modernization"
as an urgent step in the process of democratization. In his article,
,,Kindaiteki ningen ruikei no sAshutsu-seiiiteki shutai no kibon no mondai"
(1946), Otsuka writes as follows:
It is absolutely imperative today that Japan's economic and social founda-
tions be overhauled completely along democratic lines. Both energy and
initiative for democratic reconstruction, however, must be voluntary,
coming from within this defeated nation. Democratization in any sphere of
life if carried out simpty on a@ount of pressure and coercion by foreign
military forces will inevitably produce nothing more than a paper demo'
cracy, a "dead mechanism" of democracy. In order to instill new economic
life in a truly democratic environment, indigenous political forces dedicated
to a thorough reformation of Japanese society must mature to the point
where they can effectively coordinate and constructively orient popular
energy for this vital enterprise.(3)
Although he does not dismiss the paramount importance of the material
basis for democracy, Otsuka stresses here that a thorough reformation
of Japanese society be preceded or at least accompanied by a complete
reorientation of the people's ethical outlook. He also claims that the
radical change of the general value orientation, i.e., the creation of "a
modern and democratic citizenry," must most effectively be done through
education designed to train Japanese people "in modern, democratic
patterns of conduct."
These proposals of otsuka reflect his understanding about how western
democracy came into being. Out of the gradual disintegration of feudal
social order in Western Europe, Otsuka argues, emerges a new way of
life, or an "ethos" in Weberian terminology. As a prerequisite condi-
tion for the emergence of modern democracies in Western Europe,
ffiation of Modern Man: The Popular Base for Demo'
cratization," in The Japan Interpreter, Vol. VI, No' I (Spring, 1970)' p. l'
(455)
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Otsuka especially refers to early Protestantism, to its ascetic tendencies
including the concept of duty in calling. On the other hand, Otsuka finds
several characteristics of the Japanese mentality which he believes ex-
emplify its basic "pre-modernity," as the following citation clearly illus-
trates:
In the first place, Japanese have failed to demonstrate the kind of inner
spontaneity that underlies the social behavior of modern men. Secondly,
they have little sense of fairness or equality . . . that is so characteristic of
modern civil society. Thirdly, they have shown only fleeting respect for
the concept of rationality, the very backbone of modern science. Finally,
they do not share the feelings oflove and respect for the nameless masses of
people, fcelings which constitute the core of the ..modern spirit" and which
nourish a social concern for the poor and underprivilege(.trl
These characterizations seem too simplistic and stereotyped from today,s
vantage point of view. But they not only reflect faithfully an intellectual
atmosphere of the age, but also reveal, to some extent, what Otsuka under-
stands by "modernization." At any rate, the following facts should be
confirmed from what has been said heretofore. First, in Otsuka ..demo-
cratization" means 1'modernization." Second, "modernization" itself
is parallelled with westernization because western societies, especially
Great Britain, provide the defeated Japan with a model of modernization.
Of course, Otsuka does not believe it possible for Japan to imitate a
Western model literal/y, because historical backgrounds for Western.and
Japanese societies are too different. But Western European societies,
Otsuka believes, give Japan at least an "ideal type" (in Weberian phrase)
for the modernization of its society. Third, Otsuka emphasizes the im-
portance of the "modernization" of human thought and behavior in a
very comprehensive context which involves not only the transition from
feudalism to capitalism but also the transition from capitalism to socia-
lism,(s) although he does not explicitly say so in this article.
How about an "ideal type" for modern men? Otsuka here too follows
Max Weber who characterizes the ethos of modern Western Europe as an
(O fbjこ,p.3.
(5)ci σ′sttα″isαο
“
ο∫
`此“
力′σokyO:Iwanami shoten,1969),Vol.8,pp.61(■
617.
(454)
n
"ethic of inner values" and that of 
Asia as an "ethic of outer values'"
Thus Otsuka recommends that the Japanese 
people form a new frame of
reference, i'e', "an 
"tU" 
of iootr values"' as the followitrg quotation 
clearly
shows:
Japanese people must leam to appreciate 
their individuality and their worth
as human ot't*' ;";;;;;t: freeindividuals 
capable of creating a
new social otO"' 
""4 nt'"rn"ting 
public welfare on their own initiative' with'
out being ,i'"" 
"t-"ittt""r-ot-0"' ""t' 
as "pre-modern" natural law' An
internally-fired, living democracy can emerge 
only out of a society of free
individuals'(o)
But serious questions immediately arise' 
For example' is it so obvious
that, given perfectly rational' autonomous 
people' they can build and
maintain a self-contained and independent 
social order without any ex'
ternal order or objective criterion? Yet' we 
propose to postpone treating
this question until we finish examining 
a similar question in the case of
Masao MaruYama'
Finally, Otsuka emphasizes that human 
thought has a relative degree
of independence frorl external conditions' In 
his articl e' "Gendai nihon
no shaksi ni ot"* nfngenteki jdky6" (1963)' for example' 
he writes as
follows:
I was trying to find a certain relationship 
between people and ideas. when
a particular 
'u*;;;;;;;"t": 
* 
"ll;;* 
incapturing the hearts and
minds of people' one can say that those.people 
have acted 1 a sounding
board for *" 
""""'-'i" 
sounding board produces sympathetic 
vibrations'
completing t't;d;;u"*L" 'iututot and 
vibrated' thought and
people' *, ;;;;;; *u'' Td.''til] is' the motivation 
of the people to
respond 
't ""il'" 
i"' i" particular io3' Ttre tendency right after the 
war
was to attribu;**"-Ot'"*tic vibrations between 
men and ideas to
objective, 
"-.J.il.,;;;...,iJ 
o, the politicat and economic conditions 
of a
certain status r-,r, 
"" 
*1rn*11'1.;1"#:'il""J:'::l? flTtffi;
:'.,T#:T"il;:j:lrffi l*i:.T'T:]ilffi .;;*sorervbvex'[ernar
stimuli " " It stands to reason tnut,..O*n 
a commonly-shared external
"n"i.on."n,.*i"**"'"*"onoporitioiuspectsaregeographicallyand
sociallv *J;;;t;;;i;in" *t*"tio" of a certain idea will 
depend not
on external but on internal factors' ti" iO* either succeeds 
or fails in
penetrating popular thinking depending on the ideal (inner) interest people
have developed, and the degree to which those interests are shaped.(?,
Perhaps to what extent human thought is independent from external
conditions will be an open question. For our present pu{pose, however,
it may suffice here to confirm the fact that otsuka stresses relative in-
dependence ofhuman thought or consciousness from external conditions.
Masao Maruyama championed "the cause of an enlightened and
democratic future, urging that the present transcend the past in order to
create a society that should have been and ought 16 gs."(8) But most of
Maruyama's statements about the democratization or modernization of
Japanese society are what we might call pathologicar rather than physio-
logical.to) They explain various obstacles in the way of a more rational
order of government and of an autonomous mind (subject). Neverthe-
less, we can recognize Maruyama's own "prescription,, for the demo_
cratization of Japanese society: The Japanese must become the subject,
not the object, of politics, by developing (or acquiring) the modern con-
sciousness which sees the political order not as "given" like a natural
order but as a human inyention.(r0) The paradigm of nature (shizen)
vs. fabrication (sakui), or more exactly, the paradigm, .,from nature to
fabrication," plays a key role not only in Maruyama himself but also in
the Maruyama school, one of the most domineering schools in Japanese
political science, to such an extent that I want to confine myself to the pro-
blematic character of the paradigm itself in this paper.
In order to illustrate the problematic character of the paradigm, ',from
nature to fabrication," Iet us sketch very briefly the western view on
(?) Hisao Otsuka, "My Thinking in Retrospect,', io ibid., p.6.(8) Tetsuo Najita, "Reconsidering Maruyama Masao's Studies,* in The Japan
Interpreter, Vol. XI, No. I (Spring, 1976), p. 98.(s) cf. Masao Maruyama, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese politics(London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. xii.(r0) Masao Maruyama, "'Dearu' koto to .suru' koto,,' in Nihon no shisd (fokyo:
Iwanami shoten, 196l), pp. 153-I80, for example, can be seen as a popularized version
of his prescription for the democratization of postwar Japan.Om"…¶mmation of器絆識 織 lttTFm∝
cratization,"in動`Japalt IPtr′
″r`′″
(453)
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n3fu1s.(11) It is no exaggeration to say that Nature has been a sovereign
problem of (political) philosophy from the very beginning of its history.
what is Nature? what is the nature of a thing? If we take into con-
sideration the too obvious fact that the human being is also a part of
Nature, then the famous Socratic dictum, ..Know thyself,,' also can be
said to be another version of this fundamental question: what is the
nature of myself? In other words, ever since nature has been discovered,
people seem to have tried to satisfy themselves with what nature means.
The development of modern philosophy as a whole testifies to the fact
that nature is still a principal problem for the human existence. yet
modernity is decisively characterized by its negative attitude toward nature,
i.e., "Escape from Nature into the Ego or Will.,' To put it somewhat
differently, nature in modernity becomes a big problem in a different
sense. A brief comparison between the ancient and the modern view on
nature will be very useful in this context. The ancients seem to have
believed that nature indicates the end toward which human life and
everything else should be directed, and under whose guidance they should
be organized. People in antiquity also seem to have believed that nature
and freedom are compatible. By contrast, nature is no longer what in-
spires human activities and opinions in modern times. Rather nature is
conceived as something conditioning or determining. For example, in
Kant the realm of Nature, i.e., the realm of the causation of necessity is
in contradistinction to the realm of freedom. Hegel also advocates a
retreat from nature as a very prerequisite condition for freedom. He
argues, for instance, that choice is a minimum and determination is a
maximum in a society where "nature," e.g., caste is an overwhelming
factor. In short, nature now is the obstacle to freedom, and nature
therefore sipifies simply the object to be reconstructed (or conquered).(It should be also remembered that the state of Nature is conceived by
(rr) In the following discussion I depend partly on Jacob Klein, ..on the Nature of
Nature," in The Independent Journal of phitosophy, vol. III, 1979, pp. l0l-109, Joseph
cropsey, "Liberalism, Nature and convention," in The Independent Journal of philo-
sophy, YoL IV, 1983, pp. 2l-27, and the same author, "political Life and a Natural
order," in Political Philosophy and the Issues of politics (chicago & London: The
University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp.22l-230.
(451)
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Hobbes as bellum omnium contra omnes ot homo homini lupus.) No
doubt, the collapse of teleological definition of men and the world and its
immediate replacement by the mechanical definition reflect this drastic
change in human perspective on nature from the premodern to the modern
ages. People now turn their face from nature as an end to history as a
process (or "the progress toward consciousness of freedom" in Hegel's
own words).
Moreover, the modern insight into the very close connection between
knowledge and freedom, rray, a perfect conjunction and mutual support
of reason and freedom, I believe, has much more relevance to an escape
from nature. To put it in a simple form, modern philosophy, especially
Hegelian philosophy, makes a claim to the effect that a human being is
perfectly rational when he is perfectly free, and vice versa. What does
this mean? This means that a human being is perfectly active when he
is perfectly rational, and vice versa. In other words, when a human being
is re-active, it is not his reason that is active, but rather it is his passion
such as fear. Conversely speaking, a human being is completely passive
when he is subject to, or re-active to, passion, i.e., nature. In brief, free-
dom and autonomy is one and the same. When a human being is
autonomous in the fullest sense of the word, he is no longer dependent on
external things. Thus emerges self-determination from within. The
absolutization of knowledge is tantamount to the perfection of freedom.
The advent and development of a typical mode of modern polity in the
West, either republic or liberal democracy, can be simply regarded as a
political reflection ofthis notion ofan escape from nature.
Finally, let us point out that in modernity there seems to be the duality
which sees the overwhelming power of nature in the sphere of science
and sees the utter irrelevance of nature in the sphere of politics (or
morality). To be more specific, the modern age is characterized, by an
absolutely comprehensive scope of nature in the realm of science (theory).
Modern natural science has successfully unveiled the laws (or secrets) of
nature and has accomplished enormous achievements by amplifying vastly
the power of nature. On the other hand, the modern age is characterized
also by a vacuity or abandonment of nature in the realm of politics (prac-
( 450)
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tice). We no longer base the criterion of right and wrong upon nature,
but rather resip that criterion to the jurisdiction of human invention or
contrivance. Thus in modernity there seems to be a huge discrepancy
between theory and practice with respect to the status of nature. Of
course, one might argue, there is a possible gap between theory and
practice at any time and in any place. But the discrepancy we are now
talking about is of paramount importance, because it emerges as an
inevitable consequence of the ego-oriented philosophy. Thus we are liv-
ing as if there is no single ground between Sein and Sollen, or, we are living
under the impression that there are two grounds. Thus we become the
investigators in the domain of science, and at the same time the creators
in the domain of morality. Then very serious questions arise. For ex-
ample, within that limitation, what does the integration of the two grounds
mean? Can we reconcile the function of an investigator with that of a
creator? Is there such a thing as a natural morality? Although these
questions are enonnously difficult to answer, one thing is rather evident
from the above discussion: Modern (political) philosophy seems to imply
that moral distinctions are invented in the light of knowledge that nature
abstains from indicating moral distinctions. In other words, an invented
morality (and therewith an invented politics) may be a derivation from,
but not an indication of, nature.
Given this vast tradition of modern (political) philosophy, where does
Masao Maruyama occupy his place? We say he occupies his place de-
finitely somewhere in the same tendency to an escape from nature to the
ego. (Maruyama proclaims that for him "the world since the Renaissance
and the Reformation is a story of the revolt of man against nature.")(Lz)
Maruyama's famous paradigm, "from nature to fabrication," then, is not
immune from the problematic character of the modern Western view on
nature just described above. Let me add one more obvious piece of
evidence. The fact that the paradigm, "from nature to fabrication," is
deficient or at least problematic can be easily seen from the recent mush-
room growth of environmental and ecological movements.
(12) Masao Maruyama, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, p. xv.
Italics are added.
(4/,9t
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To be sure, Maruyama's attitude toward "nature" can be said to be
ambivalent, because he does not advocate the paradigm-revolution from
nature to invention in the sphere of politics without reseryations. Two
reservations should be mentioned in this context. First, Maruayma
admits that "nature" in some cases connotalgs n61m.(13) Second, he is
very aware of the problem of the absolutization of the autonomous
personality, i.e., the arbitrariness of a political ru1g1.(ra) Thus he cannot
fail to encounter at least these two problems. First, what is the relation
of nature as norm to the principle of human fabrication? Second, how
can the reconciliation or integration of the conflicting views of a political
order be achieved? (In a democracy the problem of the absolutization
of autonomous personality is not so much the arbitrariness of a political
ruler, i.e., absolutism, as the arbitrariness of all or most of citizens, i.e.,
anarchy.) Maruyama advocates the establishment of the "personal
subject" (jinkakuteki shutai)-not only in the sense of the freely knowing
subject (jiyuna ninshiki shutai), but also in the sense of the ethically
responsible subject (rinritekina sekinin shutai) as well as in the sense of the
order-creating subject (chitsujyo keisei no shutai).olt But this advoca-
tion remains extremely abstract, as far as Maruyama is silent about the
above-mentioned two questions. It might be argued that Hegel is wrong
when he glorifies the State as the embodiment of morality. It must also
be said, however, that Hegel's theoretical attempt to socialize the auto-
nomous selves itself is not an error. By contrast, at least as far as I know,
Maruyama does not explicitly show his own solution to the problem of
the disintegrating effects of the liberation of personal subjects.
As we have already suggested earlier, Otsuka seems to have encountered
a similar problem in principle. But, it seems to me, he does not solve
this problem, either. Nay, he does not seem to have recognized the ex-
istence of the problem itself. He seems to convince himself that he has
(13) Cf. Masao Maruyama, "Rekishi ishiki no 'kosd'," in Rekishi sir'sdsir? Masao
Maruyama ed., (fokyo: Chikuma shob6, 1972), pp. 3l-32.(r4) Masao Maruyama, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japaz Mikiso
Hane rans., (Iokyo: University of Tokyo Press; Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1974), esp., pp. 231-238.(15) Masao Maruyama, Nihon no shis6, p, 63.
(448)
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disposed ofthe problem by appealing to the life-style (behavioral pattern)
of Robinson Crusoe written by Daniel Defoe' especially by referring to
crusoe,s 
.,economic ethos,, on a lonely island.(16) If this is the case, then
Otsuka fails to distinguish a very crucial distinction between economic
ethos (vocational ethics) and public morality' Or he underestimates
the fact that Crusoe lives on a lonely island, i.e', without a society'
Finally, I want to comment on Maruyama's relation to Marxism'
Theoretically, Maruyama has had enough of a baptism in Marxism to be
unable any longer to treat "culture" and "philosophy" as self-sufficient
entities, divorced from their social-historical context or from the society's
class structure.(1?) On the other hand, like Otsuka' Maruyama is not
necessarily satisfied with the Marxian explanation that ideologies are
..ultimately,,conditionedbytheirsocialinfrastructure.ThusMaruyama
emphasizes the importance of human perspectives (Aspektstruktur) or
paradigms (Denkmodellen) which he believes play "an intermediary role
betweenthesocialbaseandindividualsocialorpoliticalideas'',(l8)
Practically, Maruyama is engaged in the activities which seek to prevent
revision of the constitution of Japan, not only against the reactionary
who regard the Constitution as "too democratic"' or "contrary to the
tradition of Japan," but also against the leftists who consider it
"bourgeois." In his view, the principles of the Constitution such as
human basic rights should be aufgehoben as intinsic values even in the
higher stage of history, i.e', in a socialist society'
To summarize: Both Otsuka and Maruyama have theoretically con-
tributed a great deal to the liberation of the autonomous personality
(shutaiteki jinkaku) as a prerequisite condition for the emergence of truly
democratic citizenry in postwar Japan. Moreover, they provide us with
the vocabulary and conceptual framework with which the succeeding
generationswillcomprehendanddiscussthepotentialityandactualityof
ffin Robinson Crusoe,,, in Shakaikagakuyna!! (Tokyo:
Iwanami shoten, 1966), pp' Si-tft' See also Otsuka Hisao chosakushil' Vol' 8' pp'
214-222 and 275-300.(1?)MasaoMaruyama,studiesinthelntellectualHistoryofTokugawalapan,p,
xxvi.(18) Ibid., pp, xxviii-xxix.
(447 )
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citizen participation: "ethos", "rationality", "moderniz:ttiort,,, ,,spon-
taniety", "autonomy", "voluntariness", "nature vs, fabrication", and
so forth. It must also be kept in mind that their theoretical activities and
specific (practical) proposals for democratization are done in their con-
scious-althouggh very sympathetic-rivalry against Marxism. Finally,
nevertheless, they seem to have failed to consider the very complicated
relation of nature and human invention adequately enough to give us any
positive guideline to socialize the emancipated selves.
Authority and Autonomy
The citizens' movement from the 50's to the early 60's is characterized
not exclusively but primarily by its grave concern with "peace,,. The
Japanese people tried to maintain their peaceful life from both interna-
tional and national threats: They sought to keep Japan from involving
itself in the Cold War and to protest against the government,s policy
of "reverse the course." Thus the citizens' movement in those days had
both an international and a national perspective. (This wide and highly
political perspective is clearly contrasted with the rather narrow and local
perspective of the citizens' movement after the late 60's whose main con-
cern is every day problems such as pollution or consumers, price.) The
most notable instances of peace-oriented movements are the movements
to ban atomic weapons, terminate the United States-Japan Security
Treaties, and to end the Vietnam War. Especially, the Anti-security
Treaty Movement of 1960 is highly appraised with regard to the emer-
gence of the democratic citizenry in Japan. Although it failed to prevent
revision of the security treaty, that movement succeeded in forcing the
Kishi cabinet to withdraw. Furthermore, 4,580,000 people had parti-
cipated in rallies, 4,280,000 in demonstrations, and 7,060,000 in labor-
union strikes to create the largest popular movement in postwar Japan.0)
Recently, however, some scholars have been challenging the above-
(1) These figures are based on Bradford L. Simcock, "Citizens' movements,,' in
Kddansha Encyclopedia of lapan (Tokyo: K6dansha, 1983), See also e.g., George R.
Packard, lll., Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960 (princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966). osamu Kuno, "seijiteki shimin no seiritsu,"
in Seijit eki shimin no fukken (fokyo : Ushiosensho, 197 5), pp. l-22.
(446)
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mentioned characterization of the Anti-security Treaty Movement of
1960. Michitoshi rakabatake, for example, is very critical of the demo-
cratic movements from the 50's to the early 60's. By referring especially
to the "national renovationism" movement,(21 lulubatake criticizes that
it is by no means a grassroots movement in character, as the following
citation unequivocally shows :
Peace movement, Anti A-bomb movement, protect constitution movement
were first organized as mass movements on the basis of .broad theory,
which meant the alignment of all existing culturar, female, youth organiza-
tions using most abstract and ambiguous symbols. This is the extension of
the way sohyd itself was organized almost over-night on the basis of com-
pany unions which were nothing other than the legacy of raisei yokusan
Kai, Tennd's Rule Assistance Association. The decision of the movement
was made by the active factions, sent from the Socialists and communists,
and scarcely made through the grass-roots discussions. In return, what the
movement could do was, at most, ceremonial conventions and demonstra-
tions where participants were usually recruited by quota system and paid
their per diems.(s)
In other words, the citizens' movement in the era of the national renova-
tionism was successful only in terms of the number of people whom it
mobilized, but not in terms of the quality of the participants and of the
decision making process.
Furthermore, as J. victor Koschmann points out, the opposition parties
themselves had become part of the "system", and the established mo-
vements they controlled were no longer flexible and responsive to minority
demands or new issues. They had gradually detached themselves from
the fluctuating, practical concerns of the average si1i2sn.(e)
12' According to Takabatake, the era of "national renovationism" began with the
formation ofthe sdhy6 and Iwanami intellectual group towards the end of the occupa-
tion era, but rapidly grew to be a national front after the independence, when ..reverse
the course" movement started with the return of prewar purged politicians. This na-
tional renovationism movement was the basic factor of the formation of the fifty-five
system and reached its zenith at the sixty security treaty incident. Michitoshi
Takabatake, "Basic Frameworks of the postwar Japanese Intellectual History: A
Reappraisal," (Unpublished paper, March, 1983), p. 4.(3) Ibid., p. 4.(4) J. victor Koschmann, Authority and the Individual in Japan (rokyo: University
of Tokyo Press, 1978), p. 1116.
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It is precisely against this background of the "established" mass mo-
vements that the eruption of the more recent and autonomous citizens'
movements has received wide attention by Japanese and American scholars
and journalists.(s) For the purposes of clarity and convenience, I divide
these new citizens' movements into two categories: Beheiren-type(6) and
community-type. I consider the former in this section, the latter in the
next.
Several features of the Beheiren-type citizens' movements can be men-
tioned in a very general form. First, these movements are made up
mainly of ordinary citizens, or men-in-the-street. Thus they do not recruit
their supporters or sympathizers from the usual sources of protest in
Japan-the leftist parties, radical labor unions and intellectuals, or the
student movement.(?) In other words, they are characterized by non-
elitism and political amateurism. Second, citizens' movements provide
each of their members with an opportunity for his or her genuine self-
expression as an individual human being. They value not the quantity
of the members, but their quality, especially their spontaniety. They
commit themselves to universal principles such as peace in preference to
material gains. Third, the participants reject not only the authority of
the state but also the authority of every "establishment" such as the
opposition parties.(8) Instead, they seek to accomplish self-management
(5) Ellis S. Krauss and Bradford L. Simcock, "Citizens' movements: The Growth
and lmpact of Environmental Protest in Japan," in Political Opposition and Local
Polilics in Japan, Kurt Steiner et al. eds., (Princeton, New Jersey: princeton University
Press, 1980), p. 187.(6) As an anti-Vietnam War organization Beheiren (a full name: Betonamu ni Heiwa
o Shimin Reng6 [Peace for Vietnam! Citizens' Committee]) was founded on the day
the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam began. "The wide voluntary participation of
individual citizens presented a sharp contrast to the union-centered strategies of the Old
Left. Beheiren quickly became the nucleus of Japan's peace movement, sponsoring
numerous demonstrations and meetings . . . . Tokyo Beheiren offices were closed in
January 1974, just one year after the Vietnam ceasefire agreement.,' J. Victor Kosch-
mann, Authority and the Individual in lapan, p.304. See also, e.g,, Osamu Kuno, ..Be-
heiren und6 no hatashita imi," in Seijiteki shimin no fukken, pp. 147-161.(?) Cf. Herbert Passin, "The Sources of Protest in Japan," in American political
Science Review 6l (1962), pp. 393-403.(t) J. Victor Koschmann, Authority and the Individual in tapan, p. 146.
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(iishukanri) or self-government (iichi) in the movement itself.(e)I shall not here examine a, of these points. But I want to consider
briefly the last point, i.e., the reration of authority and autonomy, because
that relation seems to be not only one of the most controversial but also
the most confused issues in democratic theories. I will examine Makoto
oda's view on the relation of authority and autonomy, because he was one
of the opinion leaders of Beheiren.
In an essay, ,,Heiwa no rinri to ronri,, (196g), for example, Oda asserts
that their feelings of war-victims of the state have provided the Japanese
with an opportunity not only to oppose to the state ..which had previously
symbolized absolute strength, authority, truth, and justice,,, but also
to accept the transprantation from abroad of such universal principres aspeace, democracy, freedom, and equarity. But the Japanese theoretical
and practicar effort to pit universar principles against the authority of the
state was not adequate. Oda writes as follows:
under present circumstances universar principre and individual experience
are in no way united against the sute. Rather, the state is equipped as neverbefore to embrace both universal principres and individuar experience.what gives the state this capab,ity is thc ideal of democracy. But nowdemocracy is also aform ofstare authority thar runs counter to the principles
of individual autonomy. This is not a dilemma that only the lapanese face.To the extent they have allowed democratic values to U"com" un 
".0,,facade, all nations of the world must grapple with it. For America, it hasspawned the Vietnam War.(ro)
I have had several opportunities to ask young Americans on their way toVietnam why they have to fight. They usually answer directly, ..To protectfreedom'" But when I explain carefully and persuasivery the actuar situa-tion in Vietnam, and ask ..freedom for whom? for what?,, their confidenceis sometimes shaken. Finally they resort to the convenien t deus exmachina, which swoops majesticaly over important distinctions betweenindividuar identity and the state, and between state and universal truths:
"It's my duty as an herican.,'rrrl
Thus oda concludes that peopre must recognize the inevitabre discrepancy
(e) Michitoshi Takabatake, "citizens' Movements: organizing the spontaneous,,,in The Japan Interpreter, Vol. IX, No. 3 (Winter, 1975), pp. 315_323.(r0) Makoto oda, "The Ethics of peace," in Authority and the Individuar in JapanJ. Victor Koschmann ed., p. 165. Italics are added.(1r) Makoto Oda, ibid., p. 165.
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between state principles and their own experience, and that they must
seek to augment their own individuality and autonomy by adopting uni-
versal principles directly, i.e., without the intermediary of the state.trz)
Oda's view of the relation of authority and autonomy, however, is what
might be called a zero-sum theory of authority. perhaps his rejection
of, or aversion to, authority comes from very sublime sources, from the
loftiest inclinations of his soul. Yet I want to make three critical com-
ments. First, theoretically, Odajs understanding of authority seems to
be very shallow and too one-sided. I have no intention to refute him
here. But as an evidence or support of my intuitive judgement I mention
Yves R. Simon's two books, A General Theory of Authority,$lt and philo-
sophy of Democratic Government,(ra) and Hannah Arendt's article, "What
is Authority?"<rsl Second, practically, it is almost impossible to expect
from oda's understanding of authority that people should try to make the
government, either national or local, more responsive to their basic needs
through participation in the political system. In other words, his view
results only in "protest", but not in "participation,'. Third, Oda fails
to understand that the foundations of morality are not always rationality,
as the quotation (ll) (on page32 in this paper) seems to suggest. We
must understand the truth of the following beautiful sentences of yves
R. Simon:
. . . , When I am concerned with the question ..What do I have to do, here
and now, in the midst of this unique, unprecedented and unrenewable
congeries of circumstances, in order to make a good use of my freedom,
in order to preserve the good of virtue?', I know that no deduction, no
induction, no argumentation, can supply the final answer. The science
of ethics, i.e., the rational knowledge of morality, would supply an initial
answer but not the final one. Between the last rationally established con-
clusion and the entirely concrete rule that action demands, there is a gap
(1s) Makoto oda, ibid.,p. r7l. See also Makoto oda, yonaoshi no rinri to ronri(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1972) 2 Vols.(18) Yves R. Simon, l General rheory of Aurhoriry (Notre Dame, Indiana: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1962).(14) Yves R. Simon, Philosophy of Democratic Governmenl (Chicago & London:
The University of Chicago Press, l95l), esp., pp. 66-71 and 144-194.(r5) Hannah Arendt, "what is Authority?" in Berween past and Future (penguin
Books, 1956), pp. 9l-141.
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that no argumentation can bridge. Doubt crippres action, or an uncertain
rule is issued, unless the wi[ and the heart are so dedicated to the good of
virtue that their incrinations can be relied upon. The erhicar man may be
unable to explain why, ultimately, he comes to such a decision: he may have
nothing to say, beyond mentioning an inclination to act in this way and oninsuperable repugnance to act in the opposite way. Thatis al.l he needs todirect his action, but more would be needed to bring about conviction inthe mind of his neighbor. Unlike scientific judgment, practical judgment,
for the very reason that it is ultimately determined by the obscure forces ofthe appetite, does not admit of rational communication. It is, as it were,
a Secret.(ro)
In our age the issue of authority has such a bad reputation that any
political scientist cannot discuss it without exposing himself to suspicion
and malice. Yet authority is present in a[ phases of sociar life.(rzr citizens,
movements which ignore this fundamental fact wilr not acquire their
autonomy itself' In this sense, it is very unfortunate for the Japanese
that no authoritative book on authority has ever been written by any
Japanese social scientist since the end of the war.
Industrialization and Community
As we have already pointed out, alongside autonomous citizens, move-
ments like Beheiren, community-based citizens' movements have spread
out throughout the country since the middle of the 60,s. The aim of
this section is to clarify some characteristics of community-based.citizens,
movements. In this respect, very suggestive and informative is the fol-
lowing remark of Keiichi Matsushita (r97r), one of the most influentiar
theorists of citizen participation in Japan:
The people of Japan are different from what they were ten years ago, perhapsbecause their patience has begun to run out. They have finally beenaroused to action, not out ofan overarching sense ofnational missioi, as inthe past, but by circumstances that are making certain areas of their personallives almost unbearable. For the first time Iince *re war they have begunto cooperate, in a very noticeable way, to do something about war and
nuclear weapons, urban bright and environmental po,ution in their localities.They are beginning to organize in what is loosely called shimin undd
(rG) Yves R. Simon, philosophy of Democratic Government,
added.(r?) Cf. Yves R. Simon, A General Theory of Authority,p. 13.(44t)
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"citizens' movements." The demands of the movements, as well as the
forms they assume, are extremely diverse, each one springing from problems
deeply embedded in local circuistances. Yet they all share bitter indigna-
tion at the industry-first policy held tenaciously by the government for so
long, the hidden spur to Japan's high rate of economic growth, and they
are all working toward implementing a policy that would give priority to the
problems of daily lifs.trt
Several features can be drawn from this observation. First of all,
citizens' movements in this category are organized spontaneously in order
to tackle with the daily problems (seikatsu mondai) in a communal life.
Thus their main concerns are neither with purely political (e.g., diploma-
tic) problems nor with ideological problems, but rather with the "public
harzards" (kogai), such as environmental pollution or other local issues.(z)
Second, most of these daily problems have been caused by Japan's rapid
economic growth and industrialization (urbanization). Thus the problem
of pollution, for instance, has not been solved by the initiatives of political
parties or of labor unions.(3) Why? For one thing, the opposition
parties themselves have not been strongly opposed to the government
policy of high-rate economic growthper se. For another, some big labor
unions have had a vested interest in common with their big businesses.{l)
Third, as Matsushita's phrase, "implementing a policy," suggests, the
community-based autonomous citizens' movements are not completely
hostile to authority. Rather in some way or other they seek to participate
in the administrative process of local governments in order to keep them
responsive.
Now I want to clarify Matsushita's view of industrialization and au-
thority in connection with citizen participation. First, although he is
(1) Keiichi Matsushita, "Politics of Citizen Participation," in The Japan Interpreter,
Vol. IX, No. 4 (Spring, 1975). p.451.(2t Cf. Taketsugu Tsurutani, Political Change in Japan (Nat York: David Mckay
Company, 1977\, pp. l9l-192.(3) Cf. Takeshi Ishida, "Basic Characteristics of Modern Japan: Value System and
Social Structure," in Japanese Political Culture, p, 17 .(4) Under these circumslances, the pollution-stricken residents have been forced to
appeal to the courts. In a sense, this state of affairs can be seen as "participation
through litigation." Cf. Margaret A. Mckean, Environmental Protest and Citizen
Politics in Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, l98I), esp., Chapter 2.
p.24. Italics are
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very well aware of the adverse effects of industrialization,(s) Matsushita
emphasizes its positive contribution to the development of citizens capabre
of true self-government, i.e., "the expansion of reisure time and educa-tion, areas traditionaily monopolized by the ruling class.,, .,Here lies,,,Matsushita argues' "the importance of industry and democracy, for it
was the increase in the productive capacity of industry and the demo-
cratic narrowing of the gap between classes that first placed leisure and
education within reach of everyone. Leisure allows the citizen time tobecome involved in politics, while education gives him the means and the
motivation to use his time in this way."(6) Second, unlike Makoto Oda,Matsushita holds a very pragmatic and realistic attitude toward authority.
Thus he says the citizens' movements are not so much attempting todestroy the system as to implement the idears behind the founding of the
new constitution(shinkenpo) and to reprace the control patterns of political
leadership with citizen-oriented procedures that wilr lead to true partici-patory government'(?) Matsushita observes that already the citizens,
movements have taken a step toward implementing the participatory
system by helping to create numerous reform-oriented local governments(kakushin iichita).{il Third, Matsushita provides kakushin jichitai with
a very constructive guide line for implementing policies to replace G.N.p.-
oriented policies. Local governments should establish ,,civil minimums,,in order to guarantee every citizen "the right to maintain the minimum
standards of whoresome and cultured Iiving,, (Articre 25 of the constitu-tion of Japan).tsl Matsushita claims that Japanese society now has thepossibility to achieve this goal precisery because of the highly advanced
stage of industrialization and urbanization.(10) Noteworthy is the fact
-
(6) Keiichi Matsushita, op. cit.,p.457. "Today we are faced with two rather un-palatable byproducts of the industrial revolution, ,h. un"ran nature of industrial de_velopment in diferent regions and umong ra.iou, segments of the population, and thecreation_ of serious urban problems-_+specially poltution.,,(0) Keiichi Matsushita, ibid., p.45g.(?) Cf. ibid., p. 462.(t) Cf . ibid., p. 463.(0) Keiichi Matsushita, civr'l minimum no shis6 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, I97l), pp. 270-303.(r0) Iba.
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that Matsushita here too emphasizes the positive contribution of industri-
aliz.ation to the development of participatry democracy in a local com-
munity.
on the other hand, Matsushita asserts that citizens' movements should
maintain amateurism in politics, as the following citation clearly shows:
It is essentiar that the citizens' movements remain aloof from internecine
party politics, regardless of local conditions, for their unique function and
contribution lies in their ability to influence political development from
outside the immediate, formal political process. For this reason, citizens,
movements will differ structurally from professional political groups, such
as the parties and the crubs that support parties. The preservation of an
amateur quality will assure the citizens' movements of greater freshness
and vitality than would otherwise be posible; it will allow them to continue
focusing on problems more basic than structure and traditional politics.r'l
what then are the political significances of citizens, movement in
Japan? Scholars' claims have ranged from the modest to the fantastic.
Margaret A. Mckean classifies roughly those claims into six categories.(r2)
Yet the bulk of the literature on citizens'movements, she points out, ..con-
sists of semiautobiographical accounts by participants, of abstract theo-
retical discussions, or of individual case histories of well-known move-
ments." In short, it consists rargery of "sweeping generalizations based
(rr) Keiichi Matsushita, ..politics of Citizen participation,,, p. 463.(12) Margaret A. Mckean, "poriticar Socialization Through citizens' Movements,,,in Political opposition and Locar poritics, pp. 22g-229. ..Some have argued that
citizens' movements are a manifestation of a changing poriticar culture in Japan, incor-porating new political attitudes and beliefs, a new popular philosophy of citizenship,
and the beginning of kusa zo ne (grass-roots) democracy. Some also say that citizens,
movements are achieving more responsive and responsible rocar governments as well
as greater local autonomy. others have noted the parallel development of citizens'
movements and progressive local governments, and they have argued that these move_
ments, s€rve as a vehicle for the expansion o[ new combinations of progressive forces
at the local level that in the future may provide the foundation for a coalition to
replace Liberal Democratic party (LDp) leadership at the national level. More
extreme conclusions include the assertion that citizens' movements are supplantingpolitical parties altogether, or that they signify the ..spontaneous,, eruption of thedemocratic millennium for Japan. some hopefur leftist ideologues have also argued
that these movements are preparing the masses to assume their appropriate roles as a
revolutionary vanguard." See also notes 2_7 to pages ZZ&iZZI.
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on spotty evidence and untested as566is1s."(r3)
Thus, in several articles and a book,(l4) M. A. Mckean herself seeks to
provide us with "more reliable data" to evaluate the significance of
citizen participation for Japanese politics. In an effort to accomplish
this purpose, she has attempted to assemble a representative variety of
movements and to interview individual participants about their experi-
ences. And she poses several questions to explore the broad political
importance of citizens' movements in Japan. Those questions include:
whey did citizens' movements arise? who participated? why did the
movements focus on the environmental issues? Is there something about
the kinds of people involved in the movements that can help explain why
they chose the particular means they did to resolve their grievances?
what effects did citizens' movements have on Japanese politics? Did
they succeed or fail? How did they affect their participants, their com-
munities, local politics, and Japanese politics more generally? and so forth.
Although I must confess here that I am personaily not quarified to
judge whether Mckean's treatment of empirical data is adequately scienti-
fic or not, Terry Macdougall points out that Mckean's "methodology is
creative but systematic and careful, yet not unprovocative, given the
inherent difficulty of evaluating the political significance of some three
thousand localized and ephemeral 
-oua."ota.'arfl At any rate, I want
to quote the following paragraph from one of Mckean's excellent articles
as a representative of "scientifically tested" evaluations of the political
significances of citizens'movements in Japan:
. . . cMs (i.e., citizens' movements) have mobilized a sizable sector of the
ordinary public to produce a new layer of issue-oriented participant citi-
zrns. By virtue of their effect on partisan change, they have also stimulated
the growth of a floating vote among their own members. Extrapolation
from aggrcgate election data indicates that there is a rerationship between
cMs and the rise of a floating vote in the general population as welr. Thus
cMs have indirectly contributed to the increase in party competition and the
emergen@ of new configurations of more responsive politicar leadership,
they have contributed to a substantial increase in citizen participation and
(r3) Ibid., p.229.(14) cf. Margaret A. Mckean, Environmenral protest and citizen politics in Japan.(r5) The lournal of Asian Sttl/lies, Vol. XL[, No. 3 (May, l9g3), p. 665.
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opinions represented in local politics, and, finally, they have shuffied and
enlarged the political elite in many communities and provided for the
emergence of a new common language among activitists whose different
political affiliations had formerly segregated them from each other. Both
by socializing their own members to be skillful political actors and by
legitimizing political conflict and providing a mechanism by which political
decisions can accommodate greater diversity of views CMs have done a
great deal to strengthen democratic processes in Japan.(ro)
Conclusion
In this bibliographical essay, I picked up several books and articles
which deal with the theory and practice of citizen participation in postwar
Japanese politics. If the above discussion is plausible, then this much
can be safely said.
First, in spite of the diversity of the demands of citizens' movements,
as well as the forms they assume, one common feature is visible in almost
all movements from the end of the war to the present, i.e., the aspiration
for the development of the democratic citizenry in terms of autonomy.
Second, the concept of "citizen" seems to have undergone qualitative
changes. The requirements for a modern citizen is very demanding in
Maruyama, because he advocates the establishment of the "personal sub-
ject" (jinkatuteki shutai)-not only in the sense of the freely knowing
subject, but also in the sense of the ethically responsible subject as well
as in the sense of the order-creating subject. On the other hand, Makoto
Oda emphasizes the status of a citizen as an ordinary man (tada no hito).
(Hajime Shinohara criticizes the concept of an ordinary rnan itself because
that concept does not include those who are either mentally or physically
handicapped.)tr) In other words, the concept of democratic "citizen"
itself has been democratized. Furthermore, the concerns of citizens
movements also have undergone qualitative changes from highly political
and ideological issues to the problems of a daily life. Noteworthy is the
fact that the citizens' demand for direct participation in a local govern-
(ro) Margaret A. Mckean, "Political Socialization Through Citizens' Movements,"
p.273.(r) Hajime Shinohara, Shimin sanka (Iokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1977), pp. 218-228.
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ment has been brought about by the failure on the part of the existing
political system (incruding the opposition parties) to solve the problems of
a daily life caused by the adverse effects of industrialization. Third, I
suggested that the relation of nature (shizen) and fabrication (sa&zi) in
political life remains to be answered. Related to this is the question of
the relation of authority and autonomy. oda sets forth a theory of world-
citizenship in which autonomous citizens adopt universal principres
without the intermediary of the authority of the state. Matsushita,s
view about authority, by contrast, is very pragmatic and instrumental.
Fundamental questions still remain to be solved. For example, is au-
thority necessary to make a common action possible in order to accom_
plish the common good? Fourth, and finally, as Mckean points out, the
bulk of the literature on citizen participation in Japan is not tested by
empirical data. Further efforts must be done to bridge the gap between
normative theories and empirical data.
I For criticism of previous versions of this paper and intellectual stimurus on thetopics addressed in it, I am indebted to prof. Tetsuo Najita and prof. Bernard s.
silberman at the University of chicago. I arone bear responsibility for the argument
of this paper.
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